

27 Nov 57
78

SECRET


ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET


INSTRUCTIONS: The officer designated in the "TO" column, number each document to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Note a line across the above table each column. Each officer should date and initial (short name) each document before routing. The routing and record sheet should NOT be returned from the checked RECORD column.


FROM: RI/AN				DOCUMENT NUMBER: MCNA-04072	
				DOCUMENT DATE:	
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. WM/REG	BARTON				
2. <i>Bar 3</i>		<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>Wm</i>	
3. <i>C/Carls</i>			<i>4</i>	<i>R</i>	
4. <i>Paul/RO</i>		<i>12/11</i>	<i>12/11</i>	<i>RR</i>	3-4: Let's make available to the interested desks the names & addresses reported here.
5. <i>H/mofio</i>		<i>17 Dec</i>	<i>17 Dec</i>	<i>W</i>	
6. <i>W/Conch</i>				<i>W</i>	
7. <i>W/Conch</i>		<i>10/12</i>	<i>10/12</i>	<i>W</i>	
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104-10173-10170


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





POOR QUALITY REPRODUCTION
"UNAVOIDABLE"



POOR QUALITY REPRODUCTION
"UNAVOIDABLE"





SECRET

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Use officer designations. Draw a line across the sheet under this Routing and Record sheet should be removed from the attached RECORD document.

"TO" column: Number each comment to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should date and initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. removed from the attached RECORD document.

FROM: RI/AN				DOCUMENT NUMBER HKMA-04002	
				DOCUMENT DATE	
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. WH/REG	BARTON		5 NOV 1957	E.B.	NOTE: If a copy or attachments are removed from the attached document, note the location of the copy and/or attachment hereon. If this RECORD COPY is to be retained in the files at the Desk, call the Central File Section for permanent loan.
2. Br 3				J	
3. Carib/Chief		6 NOV 1957	12 Nov.	K	COPY DETACHED - 1 Chrono 1 July
4. Carib/FI				M C	
5. Carib/FI				H	COPY made for J.M. KEEL file.
6. WH/FI		21 NOV 1957		W	
7. WH/SS/Emis		25 Nov 57	25	W	DEFERRED 12-1 PB set w/Sec's for 201 201 FILE OPENED ON THE BASIS OF THIS DOCUMENT
8. RECORDED					
9.					FILE TITLE LESSNICK/MENDEL 4 NOV 1957
10.					
11.					FILE NUMBER 701 219258
12. RI/AD		27 NOV 1957			
13. RITY					ENCLOSURE DATE PROCESSED 31 Oct 57
14. Carib/Sec					
14. RI/FI	1400L				ABSTRACT 0601 INDEX

SECRET

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-4-1002

(201-)
Local File No.
27-22-10

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 31 October 1957

FROM : ~~Asst~~ Chief of Station

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/JMKEEL

SPECIFIC— Subject of Reference

Reference: DIR 38898, 8 October 1957

Action Required: None, information only.

1. In accordance with reference, there follow details of Subject's case. Attachment A is a memorandum furnished to the local ODACID which reviewed the derogatory information in Station files on Subject. Attachment B is a paraphrased copy of the ODACID cable to Washington recommending a favorable decision in his non-immigrant visa case.

2. By virtue of Subject's youth, his record to date, and his promising future, he was listed as a JMKEEL target in June 1957. Contact was established with him in about August 1957 as a consequence of his non-immigrant visa application, and about six meetings have been held with him since that time, ostensibly for the purpose of fully clarifying his visa status. When and if Subject obtains his visa, PRQ Part I will be forwarded according to established JMKEEL procedure.

3. For Headquarters information, the fabricated information mentioned in paragraph 2B of Attachment A is that reported in HKH-954, 5 January 1955, and HKH-943, 28 December 1954. AMPUTEE admitted to [redacted] on 26 August 1957 that this information was fabricated.

Attachments: U/S/C

A-Memo, Subject: (Subject of Reference) 4 pages in triplicate U/S/C

B-ODACID Cable No. 200, 1 page in triplicate, dated 2 October 1957 U/S/C

Distribution:

- 3 - Washington w/attachs. U/S/C
- 2 - Files w/attachs.

25 October 1957

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

701-209258

☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ INTERNAL
USE ONLY

☐ CONFIDENTIAL

☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

RI/AN

NO.

5/catt #
HKA 4002

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

WH 04S Barton

12 NOV 95

10

2. Mrs

3. Cont/71

4. Cont/ [redacted]

Meer

POUCH MATERIAL
SEPARATE COVER
ENCLOSURE

EXPEDITE

13:

14:

15:

701-209258
31 Oct 97

FORM 1 DEC 94 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

☒ SECRET

☐ CONFIDENTIAL


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USE ONLY


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
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Separate Cover Attachment to HFM-A-1002, 31 October 1957


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








STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
SUPERIOR COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Case No. 14-00000









FORM DS 926 12-1-51	DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF SECURITY REQUEST FOR SECURITY INFORMATION	TELEPHONE <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;"> 1100017 UNCLINT </div>																																																												
To: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PLANS (CIA)		From: VO Date: 10/1/57																																																												
DO NOT WRITE ABOVE THIS LINE																																																														
I. NAME <small>(If married women include maiden name)</small> <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 100%;"></div>		<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 100%;"></div>																																																												
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ADDRESS <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 100%;"></div>		SEX <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 100%; text-align: center;">M</div>																																																												
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CONTROL: THIS REQUEST PLACED WITH THE DIVISION OF SECURITY BY:																																																														
DIVISION OR AGENCY VISA OFFICE - Security Branch		REASON FOR REQUEST, OR TYPE OF PROGRAM VISA - Security Case																																																												
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II. RESULTS OF THIS REQUEST FOR SECURITY INFORMATION:																																																														
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around;"> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> NO RECORD <input type="checkbox"/> NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> SECURITY INFORMATION ATTACHED <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Use reverse side for reporting) </div> </div>																																																														
<i>Referred</i> 100-20-1757																																																														
CHECKED BY TV		DATE <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 100%;"></div>																																																												
III. FOR USE OF DIVISION OF SECURITY:																																																														
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 40%;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 5px;"> MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR DATE 10/2/57 BY [Signature] SUBJECT: [Signature] </div> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 20%;">UN.</td> <td style="width: 20%;">BRANCH</td> <td style="width: 20%;">D.W.</td> <td style="width: 20%;">[Signature]</td> <td style="width: 20%;">[Signature]</td> <td style="width: 20%;">[Signature]</td> </tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> </table> </div> <div style="width: 55%;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; transform: rotate(-5deg);"> VISA OFFICE SECURITY BRANCH OCT 1 1957 DEPT. OF STATE </div> <div style="text-align: right; margin-top: 20px;"> 1000765022 (Date) </div> </div> </div>			UN.	BRANCH	D.W.	[Signature]	[Signature]	[Signature]																																																						
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Encl-1

RI COPY

✓ 00765022

DATE 456 SE/MK/EM
08 OCT 1957

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6
OCT 9 8 10 57	
REC'D CABLE SECT.	
ROUTINE	
IN 19889	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM :

ACTION : WM 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI, RI 2, S/C 2

TO : DIR

INFO

CITE HAVA 037

REF: A. DIR 38898 (OUT 98169)

B. HKHA 3653

SUBJ PROMINENT ORTHODOX YOUTH LEADER, JMREEL CONTACT
(SEE REF B) PAST TWO MONTHS. FURNISHED DOC INFO PROVE ANTI-
COMMIE STAND. STATION REVIEWED DEROG INFO PER ODACID CABLE
200, CLEARED SATISFACTION OFFICER HANDLING CASE.
WILL POUCH DETAILS. URGE ODACID EXPEDITE FAVORABLE DECISION
AND CLEARANCE INS IDLEWILD.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * REQUESTED CLARIFICATION STATIONS INTEREST ISSUANCE VISA
REPORTED IN ODACID CABLE NO. 200 2 OCT.

SECRET

ABSTRACT	X
DATE	8 Oct 57

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

09/24 JUL 83-14

47

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET /0600 C154 0600

INSTRUCTIONS: The office designations in the "TO" column. Number each request to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. This is the serial number under each request. Each entry should be dated and initial with name and position before being reviewed. This Review and Record sheet should NOT be removed from the attached FISCAL document.

FROM: R/R				DOCUMENT NUMBER HKH - 21544
				DOCUMENT DATE 20 AUG 1957
TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. WEL - CAS Section				E/S
2. 12/27/46		20/13	2/13	11/11
		2/13	3/13	PRO
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13.			3 SEP 1957	9
14. RI/FI				
				COMMENTS NOTE: If a copy or abstracts are removed from this attached document, note the location of the copy and or abstract removed. If this PROCESSED COPY is to be retained in the files at the Desk, call the Central File Section for permanent loan.
				COPY DETACHED - 1 Chron 1 Subject
				RECEIVED DISSEMINATED IN DEC 3 1957 NOT FOR CIRCULATION FOR FILING FILED
				FILE NUMBER 019 1009 1005
				ENCLOSURE 30 AUG 1957
				ABSTRACT X
				INDEX X

PCAM NO. 8102

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

From: [redacted] Report No: HKM-1854 Local File No: [redacted]
No. of Pages: 2 No. of Enclosures: None
Report Made By: [redacted] Approved By: [redacted]
Distribution: 3 - Wash w/mat
By copy to: 1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
2 - Files
Source Cryptonym: See contents. References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

SUBJECT: [redacted]

Comments: [redacted] arranged an introduction [redacted]
on 8 July, and he has since been seen [redacted] on several occasions.

The 5 January 1955 report was from AMPECT (HKM-954); the 6 November 1952 report from AMLU (HKM-27); both were appraised as 3. [redacted] who was denied a visitor's visa in November, 1955 largely on the strength of those two reports from the Station, is still interested in obtaining the visa and willing to clarify his status vis-a-vis the JS and FOP with the local ORACID.

It is believed this report will assist in answering that portion of the latest periodic requirements list, forwarded under HKM-S-2379, - the one concerning [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

RI COPY

17-9-5

CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY	Paraguay	REPORT NO.	HRG-1544
SUBJECT	Manfred Daniel RIVARILLA y Garcedo	DATE OF REPORT	20 August 1957
		NO. OF PAGES	2

1993

1. There is no Communist penetration of the Orthodox Party youth organization, although there are probably a few "fellow travelers" or Communist-oriented persons in that organization. If so, however, they have no influence. No past or agreement between the Orthodox youth organization and the Juveniles Socialistas (i.e., Cuban Communist Youth Organization) now exists or ever has existed. In 1952, the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP, Cuban Communist Party) and the Juveniles Socialistas, however, all of the opposition parties and their youth sections participated with Communist representatives in opposition meetings and shared a platform with them. This procedure on the part of the other oppositionists had nothing to do with the Cuban Communists themselves, but was carried on for strictly tactical purposes by each opposition group. It is a Communist practice to use without authorization the names of leaders of other opposition groups in their manifestos and declarations of intent. In fact, MIRAFUELLA's name was so used by the Communists on a number of occasions without his knowledge; and he had recently to issue a statement to the press to clarify that he is not a Communist, and never has been, neither a Communist, a sympathizer or fellow traveler. He has been active in Orthodox Party affairs since 1945. MIRAFUELLA believes that Communist ideology and economic theory is not applicable to the Cuban situation and that it holds nothing of value for Cuban politicians.
2. At the time of the 1954 general elections, the combined numerical strength of the Orthodox Party youth was between 70,000 and 100,000. Since that time, however, the Partido Nacionalista Revolucionario (PNR, Nationalist Revolutionary Party) led by Jose Manuel Llauda, and the 26 of July Movement under the leadership of Fidel Castro, have drawn to them a considerable number of Orthodox youth, so that the latter group is at present considerably smaller. MIRAFUELLA will shortly resign from the Orthodox youth organization and affiliate himself with the PNR. He is a great admirer of Jose Manuel Llauda who he believes has a bright political future in Cuba. On the other hand, Llauda's (MIRAFUELLA's) ORCA Cuba, a national leader of the Dominican Orthodox Party, does not have the magnetism of Llauda nor the latter's appeal to Cuban youth. He is especially sympathetic to MIRAFUELLA that the several independent centers of the national Orthodox Party could not only be a national movement in Cuba.

... ..

2-0-5-2-2-5-2-2-1-1

- 3 - Washington w/mat
1 - Santiago de Cuba
1 - Embassy, Legal Attache
2 - Files

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L


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
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
1. Several previous reports from this office, dated 6 November 1952, and 5 January 1955, from independent sources, and whose contents were appraised as possibly true, said that a pact had been made between certain leaders of the PSP and UB on one hand, and the Orthodox youth on the other hand, whose purpose was support of PSP activities. RIVARELLA, ~~the~~ the and the ~~the~~ the national leaders of the Orthodox youth, were named as being either Communists or sympathizers of the PSP within the Orthodox youth and principals in the pact. This office has not been able to confirm the existence of the reported pact.
2. The newspaper El Mundo, 13 December 1956, carries a statement to the press made by RIVARELLA and Oscar ROCCO, in the capacity of Orthodox youth leaders, in which they deny authorization to the UB to use their names upon a document signed by Cuban Communists, that asked for guarantees for 26 of July Movement personnel in the Sierra Maestra and a group of RIVARELLA and ROCCO state that while they fully support the message of the document, they refuse to join in signing it with those (i.e., the Cuban Communists) who do not make the same petition for the Hungarian revolutionaries who died by the thousands in Budapest. They conclude by saying that their press statement clarifies their support of guarantees for the 26 of July Movement, their desire for a just solution to Cuba's political problem, and their sentiments against those (i.e., the Cuban Communists) who still have not satisfactorily explained the Soviet crime committed in Hungary.
3. The newspapers Avance, 30 April 1957, and Informacion, 5 May 1957, contain a statement to the press from RIVARELLA, in which he says that during a recent television round-table program, his name was included with others in remarks made by a member of the Autentico Party, as being accused as Communists by the RMAC. That labor leader Eusebio MUJAL Barniol, a participant in the round-table, replied that he didn't know about the others mentioned, but he did not believe RIVARELLA was a Communist, but would investigate the matter. After ridiculing MUJAL in the role of private detective, RIVARELLA says that he doesn't have to reiterate his democratic convictions or his anti-BATISTA record, nor repeat that he is not, nor has ever been, a Communist or anything like one. He concludes by challenging MUJAL to find any Communist antecedent in his record.
4. RIVARELLA announced his new PSP affiliation in the local press during the last week of July 1957.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L









SECRET

INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Cuba

REPORT NO. .NKK-1182

SUBJECT: Felipe Antonio Cecilio
MARTINEZ Ortega

DATE OF INFO: 27 April 1957

1. On orders from Colonel Conrado CARRATALA Ugaldé, Chief of the Direction Department of the Cuban National Police, Subject was arrested on 27 April 1957 and confined in the 13th Precinct Station in Habana. At the time of his arrest, Subject had in his possession copies of Fundamental, Revista, Cuba and the Revista Confederación de Artes y Ciencias, Revista Avance, and works by Lenin, Stalin, Marx, Engels, Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Marx, Engels, Marx and Marx, among other Communist materials. A subsequent investigation of MARTINEZ by an agent of the Buro para la Represión de Actividades Comunistas (BRAC, Bureau for Repression of Communist Activities) revealed the following information:
2. MARTINEZ was born in Habana on 23 August 1927, his father being Cecilio MARTINEZ González and his mother Amelia ORTEGA Cerro. He resides with his parents at Calle Calles de Managua No. 25, ground floor, in Mantilla. He is single and a student in the final year at the Commercial Sciences School of the University of Habana. For the past year and a half he has also been employed in the Lighting Department of the Electro Sales Company, Inc., Offices 204, Habana. Subject has a sister named Carmen Elena MARTINEZ Ortega, aged 32 years, married to Roberto MIREN, who is employed as cashier in the Arechaga Company store, Habana. His sister is a graduate of the Normal School but is not presently working. He did not recall his sister's address. MARTINEZ stated that both he and his parents are registered in the Central Habana Municipal Electoral Junta; he is a member of the Orthodox Party and his father a Liberal Party member; he was a member of the Catholic Youth (Cuerpo Católico) from 1943 until 1951. He declared that on several occasions Emilio VILDES Vives had approached him to join the Juventud Socialista (JS, Cuban Communist Youth Organisation) but that he had not done so.
3. Under interrogation, MARTINEZ said he was not a member of the Cuban Communist Party but sympathized with Communist doctrine. He is a member of "Quinto Trópico" and was formerly a member of the Asociación Latino-Americana Libre (ALAL, Free Latin America Association). In 1951 he was second vice-president of the Commercial Sciences Student Association at the University of Habana.

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Report No: HKH-11482, Page 2

Date 10 May 1957

In 1953 he attended the Fourth World Youth Festival held in Warsaw, Poland. MARTINEZ stated he left Cuba by air for the United States, where he remained for several days visiting a number of universities; he departed from the United States for France via sea and, upon his arrival in France, took a train direct to Warsaw. While attending the Festival, he was invited by members of the Chinese delegation present to visit Communist China. MARTINEZ accepted, traveling across the USSR to China, where he remained for a short period of time. He returned to Cuba via Czechoslovakia, Austria, France, and Spain. His complete trip lasted approximately six months.

Comments:

1. [redacted] MARTINEZ was one of three Cuban delegates of the Cuban University Students' Federation to the Fifth National Student Congress of the U.S. National Student Association (UCNSA) held in Bloomington, Indiana, in August 1952. The Cuban delegates denounced dictatorship in general and succeeded in having the Congress pass a resolution condemning the BATISTA dictatorship specifically. Nov. 3 March 1953, contains an article showing Subject active with MARTINEZ, Raul VALDES Vivo, and Aramis MADADA, among others, in organizing a "Congreso Martiano por los Derechos de la Juventud." 171 [redacted], 10 June 1954, contains an invitation to the public issued by the Pro-Quetzala University Students Committee, to attend a meeting. Subject is shown as a member of this Committee, together with student Communists VALDES, Celis SANCHEZ Arreola, and Agustin CHAVEZ Trujillo, among others. A report dated 5 August 1955, from a source whose reliability had not been determined, indicated MARTINEZ was an active Cuban Communist Party leader who had traveled to Communist China and the USSR.
2. VALDES, who until recently was a prominent Communist student leader at the University of Habana, has been the subject of numerous reports in the past.
3. "Nuestro Tiempo" is a Cuban Communist cultural front organization.
4. [redacted] Subject signed a statement by the Free Latin America Association distributed in October 1956 together with Cuban Communists Celis and Aurelio SANCHEZ Arreola, (Dr.) Sarah PASCUAL, and reported sympathizers. This Association is a Cuban Communist-front organization.

SECRET

44-17266

6 MAY 57

SECRET 3P

From: [REDACTED]

Report No: HXN-1177 Local File No:

No. of Pages: Two

No. of Enclosures: None

Report Made By: [REDACTED]

Distribution:

By copy to: 1-2 Washington


Orally to: None

2-Files

Source Cryptonym:

References: HXN-1112, 27 March 1957

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Subject: Views of Rafael GARCIA Barcena on Cuban Political Situation.

CS-3/318636

FILE IN 201-209258

SECRET

FORM NO. 1
FEB 1948 51-20

RI COPY

19-9-5-9

SECRET

INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Cuba

REPORT NO. HX-1177-

SUBJECT: Views of Rafael GARCIA Balcena on
Cuban Political Situation

DATE OF INFO: 6 May 1957

1. Rafael GARCIA Balcena said that recently he had been in conference with Roberto GRANONTE, leader of one of the three factions of the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo) and that he had been asked to try to bring together the three factions of the "rtodoxo Party": the groups of AGRACENTE, Emilio OCHOA, and Carlos FARIAS Sterling.
2. GARCIA Balcena would like to maneuver himself into the position of being the Orthodox candidate for President of Cuba in the 1958 elections. He said that it is too soon to attempt a reconciliation in the Party and that his own tactic is to maintain contact with all the opposition political leaders in the hope that at a propitious time he will be the one person about whom no faction would have any strong objections. Subject said there was no first-class political party in Cuba but that the Orthodox were the least objectionable and the name of the party had not been tarnished as was true of the Auténticos, nor was it a party of petty politicians seeking power. Of the three factions in the Orthodox, OCHOA controls the party political machinery, AGRACENTE controls the excitable and revolutionary group in which youth and students are prominent, and FARIAS Sterling leads only a small segment of the party. He said that the "rtodoxo Youth" will not present a difficult problem within the party once they can be convinced that the way to power is not through violence but through participation in the 1958 elections. The Youth are strong enough to veto a presidential candidate but probably will not take a leading part in selecting one. He did not feel that MAX GARNICK or FRANCISCO GARNONTE had a great deal of influence among the Youth at present and said that Mario SIVANILLA was the most respected of the Youth leaders. This group eschews violent revolutionary action.
3. GARCIA Balcena pictures himself as the person who can influence the Orthodox Youth to abandon revolutionary methods, and toward this end he is writing a series of articles for such widely-read magazines as *Potencial* in which he points out to the Youth that times have changed since he (GARCIA Balcena) led the Youth in the assault on Camp Columbia. He said that his complete reversal of policy is going to confuse Cuban youth, but he feels it is the only way to bring unity to the party and prepare for the elections of 1958. He fears that May will be a month of increased violence in Havana; but, once the revolutionaries realize that they have

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Report No: HXK-1177, Page 2
Date 6 May 1957

not accomplished anything, they will be more amenable to suggestions to prepare for the elections in 1958.

4. GARCIA BArcena feels that the Ortodoxo Party has only about a 25 per cent chance of winning a Presidential election -- not because it could not command enough votes, but because the current regime of terrorism would not dare permit an opposition party to come into power. They have gone too far on the road to government by assassination, imprisonment, and robbery to give up their power, he said. Nevertheless, in his opinion there is no alternative to an election. He feels that, even if the Ortodoxos cannot elect a President, they may elect a number of Senators and Representatives in Congress. He will propose that Ramon BARQUIN be run as a candidate for the Senate even if BARQUIN is still in prison at the time of the elections. He did not believe that there were any legal obstacles.
5. Regarding Fidel CASTRO Ruz, he said that CASTRO was an impetuous and perhaps even an irresponsible leader, but one who could not be ignored in any new government because to the youth of the country he represents an ideal and for this reason no stable government could be formed without him. He said he differed with CASTRO on the matter of military principles. He does not believe that CASTRO will be able to attract any significant defections or support from the Army. He said that CASTRO originally believed that, if he could only establish a beachhead in Oriente, show strength in that area, while at the same time show the Army that he had supporters in Habana by agitating here, he would be able to find support in the Army itself, particularly in Camp Columbia. This was CASTRO's big mistake, according to GARCIA BArcena. Since CASTRO cannot take Camp Columbia, he is isolated. GARCIA BArcena did not believe that CASTRO was ultra-nationalistic but that apparently some of his followers were from the tone of some of the propaganda of the 26th of July Movement. GARCIA BArcena, because of his previous influence among Cuban youth, apparently sees himself as the person to offset or balance the impulsiveness of CASTRO if his group ever comes to power.

Field Comments:

Rafael GARCIA BArcena was one of the founders of the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo) but separated from it because of differences of opinion with the leaders Roberto AGRAMONTE and Jose ARDO Llada. He had been a University professor and instructor of military psychology at the Cabana Fortress and at one time had considerable following among Cuban youth and many friends in the Cuban Army. In April 1953 he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for conspiracy against the BATISTA Government but was released by amnesty in June 1954. Since then he has refrained from revolutionary activities and has been occupied with writing mildly anti-Government articles for various publications and maintaining contact with the principal leaders of the opposition parties. In a forthcoming article to appear in Bohemia, he will exhort the youth of Cuba to give up their violent revolutionary activities and to seek power through elections in 1958.

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22 Aug 56

From: [REDACTED]

Report No: HFM-1332 Local File No:

No. of Pages: 2

No. of Enclosures:

Report Made By: [REDACTED]

Distribution: 3 - Headquarters (1 to ICD)

By copy to:

- 1 - Embassy
- 2 - Files

Orally to: None

Source Cryptonym: See below

References: HFM-1295

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

SUBJECT: Activities of the Juventud Socialista

SOURCE: Para. 1: AMPHODARCH-1
 Paras. 2-3: AMTIVALENT-5
 Para. 4: AMPHODARCH-10

INDEX

Classification

FORM NO. 81-10
FEB 1949

SECRET

RI COPY

19-9-115-50

SECRET

Subject: Activities of the Juventud
Socialista

Report No: HKE-1332

Date of Information: 7 July - 13 August 1956

1. On 6 August 1956 Antonio ^VSARCEDO Ferrer, student Communist leader, was seen at the University of Havana distributing a fly-sheet of the Juventud Socialista (JS, Cuban Communist Youth Organization) titled Path of Cuban Youth. He had a bundle of approximately 500 copies of this document. On 10 August, SARCEDO and Iran ^WSTAT, student Communist, also distributed a sizeable quantity of Hella, official JS bi-weekly publication, at the University.

2. The above fly-sheet also appeared as a page insert in the 1 August issue of Hella. The fly-sheet consists of a letter, dated 2 August 1956 at Havana, from the JS National Executive Committee to Cuban youth. After setting out the Cuban Communist line against partial elections and for revolutionary action on 12 August against the BATISTA Government, the letter states the Executive Committee has decided to appeal to the national leadership of all opposition youth organizations and other "institutions of the new generation" to join in immediate acts of protest against that Government. The letter states the Committee has approved a new letter to Cuban working rural and student youth, which will shortly be circulated. Mention is made of an "exemplary" assembly of youth organizations, convened in Santiago de Cuba on 18 July by the Orthodox Party Youth in their meeting hall in that city. Among others, it is said, leaders of the following groups attended:

- Orthodox Party Youth
- Auténtico Party Youth (both CRAU and FRIO sections)
- Juventud Socialista
- National Federation of Secondary School Students
- Student Federation of Santiago de Cuba
- Nationalist Revolutionary Party Youth

Classification

SECRET

FORM 91-53

MM-1332
Page 2

26 of July Movement Youth
Certain working youths

3. [redacted] following agreements arrived at at this meeting:

- 1) Publish a manifesto repudiating partial elections and calling for mass action against the BATISTA Government.
- 2) Name a youth commission to contact leaders of each political party demanding that they repudiate partial elections.
- 3) Send a letter to the Federación Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU, University Students' Federation) in Habana demanding that they declare a traitor any ex-FEU member supporting partial elections.
- 4) Create "fighting committees" (comites de lucha) in every youth center regardless of politics.
- 5) Carry out a commemorative march on 12 August.

[redacted] the Committee agrees wholeheartedly with the results of the 18 July meeting in Oriente Province and invites all youth groups to unite in support of the above agreements.

4. [redacted] as a result of the 18 July convention in Santiago de Cuba, the US is promoting a similar youth meeting for Habana.

Field Comment. Prensa Libre, 8 July 1956, published an agreement of the National Executive of the Oriente Youth, over the signatures of [redacted], Joaquin GARCIA, Mario FERRER, Oscar GARCIA, Marcos [redacted] and others, rejecting the proposed partial elections. Avance, 7 July 1956, carried an article stating that Interior FEU President José MARTÍNEZ announced the FEU opposed the partial elections and would pass judgment upon such of its ex-members as had accepted the Government's electoral plans in their present capacity of opposition party leaders. Among such ex-members were named Enrique SUAREZ, now Secretary General of the Partido Nacionalista Revolucionario (PNR, Nationalist Revolutionary Party), and Emilio ABELA, now political chief in Oriente Province. Information, 9 July, said in an article that the secondary school association in Santiago de Cuba had not and agreed to a united front against partial elections. FEU official Juan GARCIA participated as a delegate, and it was agreed to conduct a civic march in the city on 12 August. The local press of 12 August reported that MARTÍ and 22 students were arrested in Santiago on 11 - 12 August in connection with public manifestations against the Government.

17-4-110-54

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

14 Feb. 56

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

RI/ANALYSIS

TELEPHONE

NO.

H K H - 1216

DATE

TO

ROOM NO.

DATE

REC'D

FWD'D

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

WH

046

28 Feb

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appt - Cuba

BARTON HALL

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29 Feb

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19 4 110 36

ABSTRACT

INDEX

DATE

24 FEB

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UNCLASSIFIED

FILE IN 201-209258

CONFIDENTIAL

From: [REDACTED]	Report No: EKH-1216 Local File No: [REDACTED]
No. of Pages: 2	No. of Enclosures: None
Report Made: [REDACTED]	
Distribution: [REDACTED] By copy to: 2 - Washington 1 - Emb, LA 1 - MA 2 - Files 1 - MA 1 - AA Orally to: None	
Source Cryptonym: Para 1 - AMOGER	References: EKH-1212
Para 2 - ALGIVALENT	

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Subject: Revolutionary Activities

Comments:

1. A copy of the letter summarized in Paragraph 1 is on file at this Station.
2. The information contained in Paragraph 2 was obtained by ALGIVALENT

Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

19-4-110 36

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Revolutionary Activities

Report No:

RKE-1216

Date of Information: 12-13 February 1956

plans by Communists and oppositionists to create disturbances on 13 February, the anniversary of the death of student Rubén BASTISTA, and on the Cuban national holiday, 24 February 1956:

"The leader appears to be Fidel CASTRO, who from abroad is directing over 50,000 youths throughout the island. Other leaders are: ~~FRU~~ ECHEVARRIA of the Federación Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU; University Students' Federation).

"Américo CHAPLE Trujillo, FEU leader, national director of the Juventud Socialista (JS, Communist Youth group), who has just been elected president by the School of Philosophy and Letters.

"Gustavo MARIN of the Movimiento de la Nación, who is closely connected with the Communists of the University.

"Enrique BORGES,

"Max LASHICY of the Juventud Ortodoxa Insurreccional.

"Dr. Eduardo CORONA, long-time Marxist but pseudo Orthodox director of insurreccional line.

"As a prelude to the commemoration of the fall of student BASTISTA, they will again mobilize national opinion, this time in a united front of struggle with the sugar, port, and transportation workers, whom they say they have on their side.

"Communist and oppositionist youths are spreading defeatist rumors to the effect that the year 1956 will be tragic in national history, the political situation is very dangerous, a feeling of insecurity reigns. The Communist and oppositionist student brigades of the so-called Popular Front of Guido GARCIA Inalán and others are painting

Classification:

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REF ID: A1-53

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1216, Page 2
14 February 1956

on the walls of houses Marxist mottoes such as 'Abajo BATISTA' and '26 de Julio' and waging a campaign of proselytism in favor of the so-called 'Revolutionary Emigrés,' this is, the mobilization of Fidel CASTRO."

2. [redacted] plans for a revolutionary coup on 26 February 1956 [redacted]

"The conspiracy is continuing to develop feverishly, and there is a danger that the revolution may break out any time before 26 February."

Among the revolutionary leaders are Juan FUERTES Irujo and Roberto LEON Lemus. Also involved is Eusebio FERNANDEZ Cret, who has returned to Cuba. Almost all the revolutionary leaders who were in exile are now in Cuba. It is possible that (Dr.) Angelito SANCHEZ Arango may also be back here.

"The meetings held at the farm of Fidel CASTRO's cousin near Ojira de Molena have been attended by officers and enlisted men of the Army and the National Police. Last week important meetings were held on Thursday and Saturday, attended by Fidel CASTRO, his brother, and his sister."

"The preparation for the revolution has started with the placing of bombs and petards. The person who placed the petard in the National Capitol last Friday was Juan RODRIGUEZ."

"The revolutionary plotters include in their violent plans the elimination of different persons connected with the BATISTA regime. One of the first to be eliminated is (General) Rafael SALAS Cardenas, Chief of the National Police, who it is expected will be eliminated by police officers connected with the conspiracy. Another possible victim is Eusebio MUJAL."

"Since 1-February a group of revolutionaries from Habana have been in Camaguey, including one man from Calabazar, Habana Province, who is to eliminate three persons from Camaguey. The revolutionary leader in Camaguey is Medelino OLIVARES, who suffered imprisonment and torture during the dictatorship of MACHADO."

"Groups of revolutionaries from Habana are in all the capitals of the provinces, working with the local groups. The revolutionaries predict that there will be much bloodshed."

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POOR QUALITY REPRODUCTION
"UNAVOIDABLE"

CONFIDENTIAL

Report No: EMB-1216, Page 3
Date 24 February 1955

Field Comments.

1. The confidential letter to the Cuban DI is considered to be an obvious attempt to put the major blame on Communist elements for recent anti-Government demonstrations as evidenced by the reference to paintings on the walls of houses such as "Abajo Batista" and "26 de Julio" as "Communist mottoes." Recent reports also indicate that the FBI is opposed to the acceptance of Communist support in its demonstrations and refused permission to COMRAH and other CP members to participate in the 10 January event honoring MALLA. The contents of the confidential letter are therefore evaluated as "Confidential."
2. No information is available to confirm the reported presence in Cuba of Eufemio FERNANDEZ Ortega, Fidel CASTRO or Aureliano BARRERO Arango.

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6. P. 1

10-5-55

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

11 Oct 55

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (show me) the sheet before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: RI/ANALYSIS				TELEPHONE NO. WHH-1123			
TO	ROOM	DATE	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS		
WH		25 OCT 55	ms		Political Activities		
		26 Oct 55			CONFIDENTIAL		
					CS-77501		
VN		22 OCT 55			DISSEMINATED		
WH					REASONS		
CS/ICD					V777		
					P-3		
					APR 5		
					19 7 7 244		
					ABSTRACT X LEX X		
					DATE 17 OCT 1955		

FORM 610


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CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Political Opposition to
Batista Government

Report No: HQ-113

Date of Information: Current

The following report was received from an active member of the political opposition:

"As a result of differences which arose between Carlos PRIO Socarras and Dr. Ramon GRAU San Martin after PRIO succeeded GRAU as President in 1948, the PRC (a) is now split into two groups, one headed by PRIO known as "Auténticos Electoralistas" and the other headed by GRAU known as "Auténticos Electoralistas". After the break between PRIO and GRAU, GRAU endeavored to form the "Partido de la Cubanía" to enter the 1952 elections. However, with BATISTA's coup d'état on 10 March 1952 and PRIO's exile in the U.S., GRAU remained in Cuba speaking in the name of the Auténticos. When BATISTA announced elections for November 1954, GRAU reorganized and registered the Partido Auténtico, of which he was actually no longer a member, and declared that he would oppose BATISTA as presidential candidate in the national election. GRAU's move left PRIO's group, represented in Cuba by the official party cadres under the direction of Antonio GUZMAN, without legality.

PRIO, VARELA and other PRIO leaders therefore declared themselves against GRAU and his supporters and refused to support them during the campaign. PRIO has also since refused to recognize any of the Auténticos elected to public office in the November 1954 elections.

Among PRIO's principal supporters are the following:

Oscar RIVERO
Rafael RIVERO
Rafael RIVERO
1. Humberto RIVERO
Luis GARCIA RIVERO
Carlos RIVERO
FELIX RIVERO
Carlos RIVERO
Sergio RIVERO
Nicolás RIVERO Morales

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Fernando MEL del Pino
 Antonio SA TIAO
 Diego Vicente
 Teodoro STUDA
 Antonio WAPONA.

"b. The Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo), founded by Eduardo CHIRAS, was organized by dissident members of the PRC(A) as a political party to oppose PRIO's organization. It was undoubtedly the majority party in Cuba in 1952 and until CHIRAS' death remained a strong political force drawing its strength from the masses. However, with CHIRAS' death and PRIO's exile it faded in importance and today is small and divided.

Dr. Carlos MARQUEZ Sterling, who has presidential ambitions, attempted to take over control of the party after CHIRAS' death but was unsuccessful in holding it intact. Raul CHIRAS, brother of Eduardo, now heads one faction of the Party. Another faction, "Ortodoxia Libre" has been formed by Carlos MARQUEZ Sterling. Dr. Antonio MARTINEZ Fraga, who was denied membership in the original Ortodoxo party, has a leading roll in the "Ortodoxia Libre". Still another faction of the original group is headed by Roberto AGRAMONTE, who also has presidential ambitions, while another group of followers of the original Ortodoxo Party remain loyal to Emilio OCHOA, a member of the Directive Council of the Party. OCHOA has refused to accept the guarantees of the Batista government and return to Cuba from Miami and thus does not participate directly in Ortodoxo activities at present. Still another group of Ortodoxo members either are favorable or sympathetic to the insurrectional thesis introduced by Fidel CASTRO and his followers. At a recent meeting of the party at Teatro Part, AGRAMONTE and other leaders were killed, and there was considerable talk of promoting armed revolt against the present regime. Fidel CASTRO, who is now in Mexico, has appointed Jos6 Manuel MARQUEZ as so-called "Chief of the Commandos" of Marianao. MARQUEZ, a young Ortodoxo, is at present in Veracruz negotiating an arms shipment for Cuba which reportedly will be brought in by a group of fishermen via La Coloma, Pinar del Rio.

Comment. In order to clear up the confusion created by sources concerning the PRC(A), it is pointed out that the original Unity Charter drawn up by the Ortodoxos on 23 March 1955 was signed by AGRAMONTE, OCHOA, MARQUEZ Sterling, Pejayo CUBELA, Antonio NARANJO, Francisco CAJAL, and others with independent tendencies. The president of this, the "Unified" Ortodoxos, is Raul CHIRAS. Recently MARQUEZ Sterling split from the "Unified" Ortodoxos and formed the Ortodoxia-Libre. Another group known as the Registered Ortodoxos is under the leadership of Francisco FERNANDEZ Casas. Apparently sources, in commenting on the various "groups" headed by AGRAMONTE, Raul CHIRAS, and OCHOA, is referring to the popular following these individuals have within the "Unified" Ortodoxos. They do not as such represent a separate segment of the Ortodoxo party.

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"c. Probably the most politically active and strongest segment of the Ortodoxo party is the youth branch, the Juventud Ortodoxo (JO). It has representation in just about every town in the Republic and is particularly active at the University of Habana. Dr. Francisco CAYNE, University professor and member of the Directive Council of the Ortodoxo Party, is adviser of the JO. CAYNE is well known for his leftist leanings. Actually, when the Partido Ortodoxo was in the original stages of organization, Communists at Habana University prepared and assisted in organizing the JO. The JO frequently attacks the U.S. with slogans that dictatorships exist in Latin America because their anti-Communism pleases the U.S. On 27 September, for example, Dr. Pelayo RICO, a well-known Ortodoxo prominent in JO activities, stated on a television question-and-answer program that the dictatorships of BATISTA subsists because the Department of State is flattered by BATISTA's anti-Communism, which is not anti-Communism but anti-democracy. The following are some of the more prominent pro-Communists who influence the Juventud Ortodoxo:

Char BARRIOS, director of the Juventud Ortodoxo, was Secretary of the Congreso Derechos de la Juventud, organized by the Communists, and has signed numerous Marxist manifestos.

Max MONICO, who was an active Communist propagandist in the University, has signed all Marxist manifestos issued at the University and has been seen on different occasions with Alfredo G. VAPA and Raul VALDES VIVO, (well-known Communists), close friends of his.

Salvador RICO, Juventud director, has a Communist background and is a member of the same University group.

Mario RIVADILLA, pro-Communist, has signed manifestos in favor of Guatemala and against the 1953 anti-Communist legislation. He is a member of the same University group.

"d. The Movimiento de Liberación Radical is a move to form public opinion and not a political party. It is built around the worldwide movement of Catholic Social Doctrine with branches in Cuba in the Juventudes Acción Católica, Juventud Estudiantil Católica, Juventud Obrera Católica, and Juventud Universitaria Católica. These organizations are forbidden by the Church to take part as such in national politics. However, Amelio CALLO and Andrés VALVERDE and other members of the organizations have gotten together with other intellectuals and formed the Movimiento de Liberación Radical to oppose the present regime. This movement, which is purely ideological, has no Communist influence up to the present time.

"e. The Movimiento de la Nación, which is also not a political party but rather a movement to arouse public interest, has gained little strength to date. Its chief spokesman, José MARCO LLADA, manages to keep it alive with propaganda; but there is little likelihood that it by itself will reach a position of any importance on the local political scene.

As independent movements, neither the Movimiento de Liberación Radical nor the Movimiento de la Nación has little or any chance of becoming strong.

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enough to register as a political entity. Their strength, if any, will be in the number of followers they can count on to join one of the registered opposition parties in the next election and the amount of influence they can therefore assert on the party's policy."

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19-7-7-244


The TO's are to be returned to the TO's office if they are found to be damaged or lost.

TO				DATE	BY	REMARKS
1/14	2/14	3/14	4/14			
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1/15	2/15	3/15	4/15			
5/15	6/15	7/15	8/15			
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NOT DISSEMINATED FOR FOLLOWING
REASON: _____

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CS-55256
CS-55922
CS-55497
CS-57961
CS-57778

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NEW YORK			

CONFIDENTIAL

From: [redacted] Report No: KXII-579 Local File No: [redacted]

Number of Pages: 1 Number of Enclosures: None

Report Made by: [redacted]

Distribution:
By copy to: 2 - Wash [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - Service Attached
2 - File (document attached)

Source Cryptonym: ANTHODAPCH/I References: [redacted]

Source, Operational Data, and Comments: [redacted]

(3)

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 31-50

COPY

19-7-2-19

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: - Anti-Nixon Propaganda
Issued by the FEU

Report No: EHX-977

Date of Information: 9 February 1955

1. A one page mimeographed sheet entitled "A Que Viene Mr. Nixon" was written and edited in the offices of the Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU) at the University of Habana. At least several hundred copies were run off on the mimeograph machine owned by the Faculty of Commercial Sciences and were distributed throughout the university grounds by Armando MITHILL. There was some street distribution in the near vicinity of the University. This sheet was about the only real result of the FEU planning which took place during the week preceding the Nixon visit. These abortive plans included a street demonstration against the visit.
2. The mimeographed sheet asks the question, "Why did you come Mr. Nixon?... To back the usurpation of power by Batista?... To spread the official opinion of giving away our natural resources to United States monopolies?... To approve the treason of Batista against Guatemala and proclaim him one of the Caribbean dictators?... With regard to the above, the undersigned youths protest this visit which interferes in our internal affairs and which insults our dignity even more than the defiling of the statues of our heroes by the Yankee sailors and of Cuban women.

Alvaro Barba Machado	Manuel Vazquez	Flavio Bravo
Jorge Medelco Peraza	Enrique Aguirre	Pedro Carras
R. Santesteban	Rafael Duran	Teoticoles Fuentes
Raul Melillo Viro	Henry Torres	etc.

The sheet then concludes with the notes: "The press, radio and television under the orders of Batista and the North American Embassy have repressed these declarations."

Field Comments

1. The clandestine communist publication Carta Semanal of 16 February 1955 asserts 7000 copies of the sheet were distributed.
2. The clandestine communist mimeographed newsletter Bohemia Continental of 15 February 1955 quotes in extenso the FEU sheet.

Classification

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19-7-2-108

2 Feb 55

SECRET

2P

From: [redacted] Report No: HKE-951 Local File No: 10-18

Number of Pages: 1 Number of Enclosures: None

Report Made [redacted]

Distribution:
By copy to: 2 - Wash [redacted] Orally to: None
1 - [redacted]
1 - File

Source Cryptonym: AMPHODARCH/I via AMPHODARCH/II References: HKE-961, 13 January 1955

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Evaluation "B" of source is for attribution to AMPHODARCH/II.

65-58861

FILE IN 201-209258

INDEX

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Classification

SECRET

17 MAY

17-2-110 18

Subject: Communist Influence in the
FEU, University of Habana

Report No: EKH-981

Date of Information: 10-20 January 1955

1. Communist activities in the University, particularly in connection with Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU, Federation of University Students) affairs, have increased during the last few weeks. Almost daily informal meetings are being held by Raul VALDES Vivo, Carlos SANCHEZ, Leonel SANCHEZ, ANTONCHENA, and Luis BONNE Ramirez. Usually these conversations concern election campaigns in the various student organizations, and facilities for the preparation and distribution of propaganda.
2. Indicative of FEU attitude toward the communists, students Roberto FUENTE and Federico SAINZ de la Maza commented, "the present and former regimes of the FEU have been obliged to work with the red elements since these elements were better disciplined for combat against the government".
3. On 10 January 1955 a crowd of a hundred or so students took part in a ceremony on the campus in honor of the Twenty Sixth Anniversary of the death of Communist youth leader Julio Antonio Mella. Prominent in the ceremony were: Jesus DUARTE, Andres LNU, Leonel ALONSO, Alberto POLAND, Raul VALDES Vivo, Rene ANILLO, Jose A. ECHAVARRIA, and Max Laspick.
4. At the ceremony there was distributed a 19 page pamphlet entitled, "Trinchera de Ideas", purportedly written by Julio Antonio Mella. Although mildly against the Batista government, the bulk of the articles in the pamphlet are Anti-United States, and anti-capitalist, and in short typical communist propaganda.

Source Comment. Paragraph 2 is more true than the FEU leaders themselves would like to believe. The FEU, unflavored with the "red essence" has long been notorious for empty, loud-mouthed sessions and propaganda. The reds simply inject a little more organization and intellectual reality and thus create more student appeal. All Latin students have a streak (large or small) of anti-U.S. sentiment, but not all will follow any empty-headed jerk who gets up to scream about "imperialists". A large percentage will respond to a subtle intellectual "realism", particularly where if panned down for their participation they can easily acquire but with the "intellectual autonomy" explanation.

Mission Comment. ~~El Nacional~~ on 11 January 1955 contains a photograph of the ceremony mentioned in paragraph 3.

Classification

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19-4-110-18

SECRET

3P

:5 Jan 55

From: [REDACTED]

Report No: HX-913 Local File No:

No. of Pages: 2

No. of Enclosures: 0000

Report Made By: [REDACTED]

Distribution:

By copy to: 2-Wash

Orally to: No one

1-

1-

2-Files

Source Category: ANTI-COM

Reference: HX-913, PARA 112-19-4, 112-19-1

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

[REDACTED]

63-55912

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Classification

SECRET

FORM NO. 81-89
FEB 1949

17-0-131-2

SECRET

Subject: Pact between Cuban Communists
and Orthodox Party Leaders

Report No: PR-954


Date of Information: 31 December 1954

1. A pact has been completed between leaders of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP, Cuban Communist Party) and certain leaders of the Ortodoxo Party for the purpose of combatting the Batista regime. Among those present at the meetings which led to this pact and which were held in the law offices of Ernesto Edmundo CONCHA, located at Calle O'Reilly No. 107, were Carlos Rafael PEREZ GONZALEZ, Communist, Gregorio QUINTELA Suarez, Communist, Francisco LOPEZ ORTIZ, Maria LIVABELLA and Francisco, leaders of the Ortodoxo youth, José, president of the Federación Estudiantil Universitaria, Amilcar VILLANO, member of the Catholic Youth and a follower of former President Carlos PRIMO. Other meetings were held in the law offices of Communist lawyers, located in the Barana de Gence, Habana, and in the locales of radio stations W.O.C.O., Radio Progreso, and Union Radio. The slogan for all these meetings was "CONTRA BATISTA."

2. Behind this pact is the desire of the Ortodoxo leaders involved to seize control of the leadership of the Ortodoxo Party and realization by the PSP that it needs to stir up its cadres with some strong action and to prove to the Cuban people that its charges against president-elect Fulgencio BATISTA have been legitimate ones. The pact calls for a two-phase attack on the Government, the first phase being the propaganda campaign against the proposed "Via Cuba" canal, to convince the masses that BATISTA is a traitor, and the second phase being one of aggressive action. The latter action would have as its objective the sabotage of the national economy and would be accomplished, mainly, by interference with the sugar harvesting (safra) and the shipping activities. Included in this action are setting fire to sugar plantations on a large scale, agitation among the sugar workers over salary and dismissal questions, a "crazes calidos" (hot-club strike) movement in the port workers sector over the question of bulk shipment of sugar which would pave the way for the union of the port workers and sugar workers, and the intensification of strikes and the support of strikers' demands in all industries. The final step would be the launching of another propaganda campaign, begun by members of student, industrial workers, and professional men's organizations, prior to the assumption of the presidency by BATISTA.

Classification

SECRET



2. Communist role in the anti-Government campaign on the subject of the "Via Cuba" canal was previously reported.

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SECRET

14-4-129-2

28 Dec 54

CONFIDENTIAL

From: [redacted]	Report No: HFI-243	Local File No: 4-6
No. of Pages: 2	No. of Enclosures: none	
Report Made By: [redacted]		
Distribution:		Orally to: none
By copy to: 2-Wash		
1- [redacted]		
2-Files		
Source Cryptonym: ANCHITZ		References: HFI-924 - 11 117 6
Source, Operational Data, and Comments:		
Subject: Communist Activity Against Proposed "Via Cuba" Canal		

68-55397

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Classification CONFIDENTIAL

(3)

FORM NO. 100 1040 51-99

19-4-117-7

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Communist Activity Against
Proposed "Via Cuba" Canal

Report No: 1104-913

Date of Information: 10-20 December 1954

1. On 9 December 1954

received information that the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP, Cuban Communist Party) had plans to launch a strong anti-Government campaign based on the subject of the proposed "Via Cuba" canal. The PSP planned to remain behind the scenes and to use as many elements of the opposition as it could to sponsor its propaganda line that the present Government had sold out to the United States and that the proposed canal was merely an extension of the Panama Canal. Groups from the Ortodoxo Party (Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo)), led by Max LESNIK, reportedly collaborated with the PSP in the planning of the protest campaign against the canal. Cuban intellectuals and professional men, sympathetic to Communism or connected in one way or another with the PSP, were to be the ones who would launch the campaign, stressing the selling-out-of-sovereignty theme and the need for a popular referendum before any Cuban government made any treaty or agreement affecting the territorial integrity of the nation.

2. On 14 December 1954 the Cuban press published an article concerning a call made by Max LESNIK, in the name of the national executive committee of the Ortodoxo Youth, to all youth organizations, including the Juventud Socialista (JS, Cuban Communist youth organization) and other organized centers of public opinion to attend a meeting at radio station C.O.C.O. on 16 December 1954 in order to join in the protest against the Government's plan to build the "Via Cuba" canal. On 16 December 1954, at nine o'clock in the evening, approximately 85 persons met at radio station C.O.C.O. in answer to LESNIK's call or in accordance with instructions from the PSP. About 75 of these persons were Communists, representing "barrio" (ward) committees of the PSP or the JS in Habana or Communist labor syndicates, and the remainder were Ortodoxo members, many of whom had had close ties with the Communists in the past. Among the latter were LESNIK, Francisco CAHON, Javier LEZCANO, and Mario RIAYLLA. Present also was Juan VILLOR Rodriguez, owner of the radio station and recently elected representative on the Partido Revolucionario Nmero (A) ticket, who advised a SIN officer at the meeting that he had not permitted the meeting to go on the air after learning of the Communist infiltration and had only allowed the participants the use of the station's hall because José PABLO Llada, radio commentator and journalist, had made such a commitment to LESNIK and he could not let PABLO Llada down.

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FORM NO. 10-59
FEB. 1959

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page 2

3. The evening's program included speeches by four persons, representing the Orthodox party and Cuban youth, who attacked the economic, labor, and social policies of the Government, the absorption of Cuban soil by "Yankee imperialists," the interference of the United States government in the affairs of the Latin American nations and its support of those which were dictatorships, as well as the proposed plan of the Cuban government to build a canal which would involve the ceding of more Cuban territory to foreign interests (i.e., the United States). The meeting closed with the creation of committees charged with fomenting public protest throughout Cuba against the present regime and against "Yankee imperialism."

4. In addition to the role it played in organizing the meeting at radio station C.O.C.O. on 16 December 1954, the PSP has also succeeded in arousing popular sentiment against the proposed canal among the university students, members of labor unions, and members of educational, cultural, and civic institutions. It has been stressing in its propaganda that the canal will constitute a principal military target and place the country in the danger zone of atomic-nuclear bomb warfare. The PSP leaders consider this anti-canal movement as a rallying point for all anti-Batista elements which can possibly be converted into the long-sought "National Democratic Front." Jose FALLO Liada who championed the "Voto Negativo" (vote against BATISTA) prior to the general elections of 1954 has also seized on the matter of the proposed canal to attack the present government by calling for a "total union of the masses in defense of the national integrity and the complete liquidation of the present regime" during his television program on 17 December 1954. Another vehicle being used by the PSP to spread its anti-canal propaganda is the Asociacion Latino-America Libre, a cultural organization reported to be a Communist front, whose board of officers includes a Communist leader and a Communist youth leader of national standing, Juan PASTAL and Gregorio M. ORTIZ A Suarez, respectively.

Field Comments:

1. Carta Semanal (clandestine Communist publication), No. 69, dated 8 December 1954, contained an article which denounced, in very strong language, the plan to build the "Via Cuba Canal." Approximately a week later the overt Cuban press took up this subject, presenting the pros as well as the cons, and was still carrying articles on it as late as 26 December 1954.

2. President-elect Fulgencio BATISTA and the present chief of the Cuban Navy, Contralmirante Jose FOMPIERZA Calderon, have issued public statements defending the plan to build the canal and blaming the Communists for launching "an insidious campaign against a project as nationalist as the Canal Via-Cuba would be" and censuring the opposition elements who have taken advantage of that campaign to attack the present government. Despite these statements and others by other government officials, the defense of the proposed project has been so weak, both technically and politically, that public sentiment against the project has apparently increased considerably since mid-December 1954.

(3)


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-7-

OFFICERS' ORIGIN designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark is sufficient) before further report. The Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

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FILE IN 201-209258







SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark inclusion!) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

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[Redacted]				DATE													
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FORM 100-27-10

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FILE IN 2Q1-209258

VIA AIR

(EXCEPT FOR SEA ROUTES)

DISPATCH NO. EUS-A-534

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, MI

DATE

21 FNE 1954

FROM : Chief of Mission

SUBJECT: GENERAL — Operational

SPECIFIC — Report of Revolutionary Preparations in Central America Against Cuban Government

REF: HKH-W-525

1. No additional information concerning alleged plans of the Caribbean Legion to attack the Batista government has been received by the Mission. The latest available information regarding revolutionary activities against that government is contained in HKH-678.
2. Reports received in the past concerning the Caribbean Legion's attempts to enlist BATISTA's support for Legion revolutionary activities have been given a low evaluation (as to content), as indicated in the pertinent portions of HKH-467 and HKH-397. To date the Mission has received no information which would warrant changing such an evaluation.
3. Indications here are that the Batista regime is too preoccupied with a possible revolt attempt originating within the country to permit planning for any offensive action against any other country in the Caribbean. Recent friendly overtures by BATISTA, in the form of decorations bestowed on Hector TRUJILLO of the Dominican Republic and PEREZ Jimenez of Venezuela, also serve to indicate that the present Cuban government is not contemplating any action against those countries.
4. As to a possible attack on the Batista regime from outside Cuba, the Cuban Armed Forces and security agencies have long been alerted to a possible air attack on key installations in Habana as well as multiple assaults from the sea. Mexico, Costa Rica, and Guatemala have been mentioned as possible take-off points for the planes to be used in the air attack.
5. The Mission has no information to confirm the allegations made in the attachment to the Department of State Instruction cited in the referenced dispatch

concerning the/

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CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO 51-28A

200-7-38-491

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- 2 -

EEH-A-615

concerning the concentration of arms in the hands of Cuban youth leaders. JOSE MARTI, PEREZ GONZALEZ, and PEREZ GONZALEZ are well-known leaders of the Organización de Jóvenes (Organized Youth) and as such have participated in overt political activities against the Batista government, demanding the restoration of the Constitution of 1959 and the holding of general elections. There is no record of Bernardo ALFONSO Garcia in the EEH files.

Distributions:

3 - Wash

1 - File

60 January 1954

SECRET

200-7-38-1391

SECRET

Cuba

-16609

Evaluation of Report of Revolutionary
Preparations in Central America Against
Cuban Government

16 Feb. 1954

21 January 1954

-4-5692

Cuba, Habana

1. No additional information concerning alleged plans of the Caribbean Legion to attack the BATISTA government have been received. Reports received there in the past concerning the Caribbean Legion's attempts to enlist BATISTA's support for legion revolutionary activities have been given a low evaluation. To date the Habana Mission has received no information which would warrant changing such an evaluation.
2. Indications in Cuba are that the BATISTA regime is too preoccupied with a possible revolt attempt originating within the country to permit planning for any offensive action against any other country in the Caribbean area. Recent friendly overtures by BATISTA, in the form of decorations bestowed on Hector FAJARDILLO of the Dominican Republic and PEREZ Jimenez of Venezuela, also serve to indicate that the present Cuban Government is not contemplating any action against those countries.
3. As to a possible attack on the BATISTA regime from outside Cuba, the Cuban armed forces and security agencies have long been alerted for a possible air attack on key installations in Habana as well as multiple assaults from the sea. Mexico, Costa Rica, and Guatemala have been mentioned as possible take-off points for planes to be used in the air attack.
4. There has been no information received which would confirm the allegations concerning the concentration of arms in the hands of Cuban youth leaders. Jose JOLESIAS, Max LESNICK, and Pedro GUZMAN are well-known leaders of the Juventud Ortodoxa (Orthodox Youth) and, as such, have participated in covert opposition activities against the BATISTA government, demanding the restoration of the Constitution of 1940 and the holding of general elections.

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
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1954



Distribution:
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2 - Files, w/encls (2 copies)

2 cc. 1/14

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58-6-4

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COPY

Early in April of 1952, about a month after the Coup de Etat of General Fulgencio Batista, the deposed president, Dr. Carlos Prío Socarrás entrusted to his ex-minister of Education and State, Dr. Aureliano Sánchez Arango the responsibility of organizing a vast subversive movement, created to depose in turn Batista, and return to power the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Cubano) if this were at all possible. The first steps taken by Dr. Sánchez Arango were to give a political form to the movement, and to create favorable conditions for an uprising (putch) at the precisely opportune moment, to be called "the zero hour." Immediately after Batista took over, the FIC found itself destitute of any kind of influence, since all former officials were dismissed by Batista. Hence Dr. Sánchez Arango began to reconstruct the FIC, placing in the positions of command some of the most sincere members of the party, most of whom had formerly been in secondary status in party affairs, and in Government affairs.

While Dr. Antonio de Varona was again made President, men such as Dr. Arcelio Acui, Dr. Armando Hernández and a few others, became the most prominent figures of the Party. Immediately, the FIC began a campaign of passive legal opposition to the administration of the Batista Government, whose every step received the condemnation and adverse criticism of the Propaganda Committee of the Party. In addition, three times a week in the newspaper, Free Press (Prensa Libre), articles by Dr. Arcelio Acui and Dr. Fene Gallo pictured the present Government as a "do nothing" one, with policies, or lack of policies, contrary to the public interest. At the same time the articles were designed to restore to the party the faith which formerly it had enjoyed from the Cuban masses.

In the meantime, Dr. Sánchez Arango initiated the opposition by force in the Central American countries. Almost immediately he found out that the reconstructed FIC was gaining no ground with the people and that he would have to create a new political formula to draw to the side of the opposition of insurrection, the general populace, by now disgusted not only with the Batista Government, but with the FIC as well. It was proposed that Dr. Roberto Agrononte, head of the Peoples Party (Partido del Pueblo Cubano), have an interview with Dr. Prío in Miami, but the latter declined on the ground that his party wanted to remain neutral in the whole affair. However, Emilio M. Ochoa opposed openly the ideas of his chief (Dr. Agrononte) advocating an alliance of the two parties to make the opposition more effective. To this end he went to Guatemala to see Dr. Sánchez Arango. While there, conferences were held in the home of Dr. Paul Ochoaga, then Ambassador of Guatemala in Cuba, and now Foreign Minister of the Government of Colonel Arbenz. There the aspects of the movement were discussed, also the merging of the two parties. On the return of Dr. Ochoa to Cuba, eventually the amalgamation was effected with equal administration on the part of both of the parties. This end was hastened by a surreptitious visit of Dr. Arango (Sánchez) to his native soil (he was then a political refugee in Guatemala).

From the moment Batista took over the power in Cuba, Guatemala placed itself unconditionally on the side of Dr. Prío and served as a base for the military preparation of the conspiracy. Immediately the Caribbean League (logical at the time reduced to impotency, began to function again, to take a preponderant

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REC 2 to HPLA 275

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part in Latin American relations. In the latter part of 1952, the military plan was drawn up by Sanchez Arango with the aid of Foreign Minister Raul Ovegueda and often in the conferences the presidential candidate (Costa Rica) Jose Figueres took an active part, promising the support of Costa Rica should he be elected president. Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo participated as well, to the extent of using his influence with the Guatemalan Government officials that they might join the movement later. On the Caribbean coast of Guatemala is a place called Livingston. To the west, there is a road which leads to a little native village (Indigena) name for the moment forgotten by this agent. To the southwest of this place, there is a very bad road which ends in a little valley at the end of which there is a series of low hills. Back of these hills is situated a camp of the Caribbean Legion. Here is established the General Headquarters of Aureliano Sanchez Arango. There exists here a force of 4,000 men regularly trained, quartered and fed. Military practice is held daily under the direction of General Abelardo Cuadra, veteran of the Spanish Civil War and one of the organizers of the movement of Cayo Confites.

The force situated here is divided into two battalions, one named Battalion #4, PABLO DE LA TORRE BIAU; the other Battalion #5, IGNACIO AGUIAR. The force is divided into small groups and taught to use machine guns (tripod type), also hand type Carab and Rifles, automatic repeating rifles 7-1. Nearly all the officers are veterans of the Spanish Civil War. In addition to the military practice, the officers get together once a week for conferences over historical and political matters as expounded by Juan Jose Arevalo, Romulo Betancourt, Aureliano Sanchez Arango, etc.

Near Livingston there is a little gulf on which is situated Puerto Barrios. South of this port, there is a tiny port not marked on the map, named Montegua. In this place with landing craft, practice is held with the idea of disembarking in Cuba. From Montegua, several shipments of arms have been made to Cuba. The other large concentration of men and arms is in Costa Rica.

Northwest of Puerto Limon on the Caribbean coast of Costa Rica, there is a place known as la Virgen. Back of this reached by a small country road, back of some low hills, is found the camp. Here are 2,000 men or more divided into three battalions, #1 Augusto Cesar Sandino, #2 Morazan, #3 Antonio Mateo. A little north of this camp, there is a kind of landing field which contains four (English) Lancaster Bombers, acquired from Canada by Ingeniero Carlos Nevia in Canada. The men in this camp carry English repeating rifles, but they also have Thompson machine guns and Mandon machine guns with plenty of ammunition. The men in Guatemala also have this additional arm.

The plan is that on landing in Cuba of the "patriots" these arms will be given to all the civilians who are sympathetic with the cause. Cubans generally are more familiar with this type of arm than the English repeating rifle, whose use is not easy to learn in a few minutes. The crews of the planes are English. The leader of the outfit is a Canadian named Christopher, who was a Captain RAF during the war, flying Lancaster Bombers. He is a personal friend of Carlos Rios Fongro. This camp did not amount to much when Cilio Ulate was President of Costa Rica, but the minute Figueres came to power, the arms and men began to

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flow in, in quantity, from Guatemala, which has been the great center for the accumulation of arms. From a place in British Honduras named Middlesex, many rifles were secured with the connivance of British officers stationed there, then passed across the border.

The plan of invasion is as follows: When the zero hour comes, planes from Costa Rica and Guatemala will arrive at Habana prepared to drop bombs over the most important military posts in Cuba. As stated before, the crews of these planes are English "mercenaries" who, for money have agreed to take part in this adventure, regardless of their politics. Coincidentally, the men from the camps in Central America will be landed in various parts of the Island. At the same time there will appear in the streets members of both parties, well-armed, to battle the local police, capture them, take over the civilian authority. While all this fighting is going on, leaders of the political parties under the direction of Eufemio Fernandez and Jesus Gonzalez Cartas will capture the personages most prominent of the actual administration, who, once the revolution is successful, will be put in jail under the charge of murder. With this action, it is expected that most of the citizens will come over to the side of the conspirators. Judging from things heard by this agent in an interview held in a Mexico Hotel between Juan Jose Arevalo and Ex-Colonel Martin Elena, the battle is set to take place before the general sale of the next sugar crop, about January of next year. While not within the province of this agent, he has learned that General Peron is favorable to the conspiracy, sending arms of Argentine manufacture to the Central American camps.

On various occasions, cargoes of arms of different makes and kinds have been introduced into the island, a procedure now made very difficult because of the vigilance of the Cuban airforce, who constantly patrol the space between Cuba and Central America. This agent knows about the following concentrations: in the hands of "Cuban orthodox youth," headed by Jose Plesinas, Juan Leznick and Bernardo Blance Goudin, there are more than 600 machine guns, 10,000 grenades (hand type) all of Mexican manufacture. The arms are hidden in the "finca" of the son of Jose Manuel Cortina, in Pinar del Rio. In the hands of Pedro Loran, head of the youth movement in Ithiama, are about 100 machine guns, 50 grenades and 10 or 12 rifles M-1. The arms are hidden in a house situated near the "Central Toledo" property of the secretary general of the workers of that central.

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MP-1-11

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

DO-1
10-27
10-28

5P

File: [REDACTED]		Report No: T-1030 Local File No:	
No. of Pages: three	No. of Enclosures: one		
Report Made By: [REDACTED]			
Distribution:			
By copy to: 3-Mach 3-Files 1-Emb		1-Orally [REDACTED] None	
Source Cryptonym: AMBIVALENT		References: T-1030, T-1031, T-1032	

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

COMMENTS

The fact that the Communist Party of Cuba would take the measures described in the attached report is not considered surprising. As can be seen from a study of Embassy dispatches and from our past reports on this subject, the PSP is finding itself in an increasingly worse position, politically, financially, and psychologically. The greatest strength of the PSP comes from ignorant laborers who are, by US standards, at least, exploited. The government reportedly claims there are half a million unemployed in Cuba. It is only logical, therefore, that communist strength remains, at present, in the field where Marxist ideology has always been used to the best advantage, that of the ignorant workers. It is probably that the PSP, as a political party, will no longer carry the weight and respect it has in the past, at least until economic conditions in Cuba grow much worse, or until the present East-West tension diminishes considerably. Until recently, two possible solutions to the PSP's present predicament lay in its uniting with the Ortodoxo Party or with the FAU. Concerning the Ortodoxo Party, it is known that the leftist groups within that party (Vicentini, ANTICA, FARDO LLADA, MARTINEZ, and others) are militating for a pact with the communists (See copy of memorandum from E. T. CRAIN to the Ambassador, dated January 23, 1952, copy of which is attached), but, so far, have been checked by the anti-communist elements within the Ortodoxo Party. Until recently, conservative anti-BATISTA elements in Cuba stated with conviction that BATISTA would join with the communists in a selfish attempt to gain the Presidency. However, BATISTA, in two articles appearing in *Caribbean*, December 2 and 13, 1951, closed the door on rumors of this kind by stating the only way the PSP and the FAU could unite would be if the PSP would publicly state that, in case of an international conflict, the PSP would side with the United Nations and against Russia. An interesting sequel to this statement, and possibly connected with it, was a leaflet distributed in the streets of Habana in early January entitled, "To the Workers of the FAU and to the People of Cuba", signed by Abdulló FERNANDEZ VELIZ (Payari), leader of the Bloque Obrero del FAU, which is known for its leftist and pro-communist sympathies. In the leaflet, FERNANDEZ claimed that BATISTA had tried to destroy him and expell him from the Bloque Obrero, purportedly, because FERNANDEZ had tried to defend "the interest of the working classes and of the Bloque Obrero within the FAU, a real and decided opposition line to the government, and is determined that a united oppositionist front be formed to defend

Classification: [REDACTED] FROM R-1030

FORM NO. 10-28
FEB 1950

INDEX

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100-1
10-22

From: Report No: TIT-1510 Local File No. 10-35

No. of Pages: _____ No. of Enclosures: _____

Report Made By: _____ Approved By: _____

Distribution:
By copy to: _____ Orally to: _____

Source Cryptonym: _____ References: _____

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

- 2 -

the government in the next elections". The pamphlet went on to say that "the action of EMLISTA is a direct aid to the very government we are fighting, a government which uses the fascist system to destroy the leaders of the workers by putting gangsters and thieves at the head of the syndicates, attacking the union halls and serving the ends of the exploiting magnates and oppressing and pursuing the true workers".

It is felt that the value of the attached information is primarily to point out a possible new force in the Cuban political scene, composed of labor groups, within the PAU and the Ortodoxo Party, who are dissatisfied with their own national party leadership and who can and probably will join with similar groups in the PSP in an attempt to get power for themselves.

Classification

FORM NO. 81-89
FEB 1943

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY SECTION

Subject: Recent Communist Advances
Within the Anti-Government Labor
Movement

Report No: TCM-1510

Date of Information: February 13, 1952

1. The two main centers of communist penetration and sympathy in the Cuban syndical movement are found in the Bloque Obrero del Partido Accion Unitaria and in the Union Obrera Ortodoxa of the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo). These groups have shown dislike for anti-communist labor leaders who have tried to join them despite the fact that these labor leaders are well-known for their honesty, ability and good intentions in furthering the labor movement in Cuba. In the past few months, and more particularly within the past few weeks, the collaboration between these groups and the Partido Socialista Popular syndical elements has become so close that it has alarmed the anti-communist Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba.

COMMENT: As has been previously reported, the present political, as well as financial condition of the Cuban Communist Party is extremely serious. It would appear that the stigma of a pact with the communists is sure political death for other political parties in the coming elections of June 1952. This has forced the PSP into an isolated position from which there does not appear to be any escape through aligning itself with another political party.

2. The communists have been and are now carrying on a campaign in these syndicates to penetrate and undermine the anti-government labor factions in an effort to gain control of these groups at a later date. This campaign was waged in three stages.
- a. The first stage was the communists' penetration of the anti-communist syndicates, paying up their union dues and using their voice and vote in the union meetings to propose and elect their candidates for committee positions.
- b. The second stage was to sow seeds of doubt among the members of these groups in joining with any of the anti-communist labor federations or with the government CIO by accusing the CIO leaders of having sold themselves out to the employers and to the government which are depicted as the enemies of the laboring man. The communists have always tried to exploit the anti-government feeling in these labor groups - particularly within the Bloque Obrero del PNU - in an effort to destroy the anti-communist labor leaders in the various syndicates.

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FORM NO. 10-52
FEB 1952

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

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Report No: TGH-1510

Date February 20, 1952

- c. The third stage, which seems to be going on now, is the ever increasing number of rapprochments between the Ortodoxo and PAU labor leaders and the communists. This is the result of a and b (above), and is perhaps hastened by the strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the FRIQ regime combined with their desire to vote this regime out of power in the forthcoming elections.
3. As an example of the success of this campaign, source supplies the following. In the Sindicato Provincial de Obreros de la Gema de la Habana, elections for a new executive committee were held January 17, 1952. The anti-communist syndicate led by Ramon LIMA won by more than 100 votes receiving 352 votes in all. However, the Ortodoxo candidates within the syndicate, supported by the communists and members of the Bloque Obrero del PAU, obtained 247 votes. In the Sindicato Textilero de San Antonio de las Baños, elections were also held recently. Again, the Ortodoxos, communists, and members of the PAU united against the anti-communist candidates. In this case, the anti-communist candidates won by only 16 votes, the anti-communists obtaining 141 and the opposition obtaining 125 votes.
4. In the Sindicato de Obreros y Empleados de Crucillas, S. A., the leadership is held by the Ortodoxos, Emilio MENEN and Tomas RIVERA. Up until recently, these leaders were in sympathy with the anti-communist CTC. However, they have recently permitted the entry of communists into their syndicate without requiring them to pay up their back dues. These leaders have also become friendly with the communist leader, Angel RIVERA, who is a member of the PSP Executive Committee of the Carro district, and two other communists, one an (fnu) REGA and another who goes by the name "Traga-niquel".

These communists and the two Ortodoxo leaders of the Crucillas Sindicato are often seen together in the Club Canido which is opposite the Crucillas plant. At the present time, there is a good deal of labor unrest in this plant because the owners are attempting to reduce the labor force. Some of the workers are proposing that the syndicate join with the government CTC so that the latter body will take action and prevent them from losing their jobs. In answer to this, the Ortodoxo leaders in the plant are saying that the Crucillas workers will have to solve this problem by themselves as the government CTC is only the "tool of the employers and of FRIQ who has sold out to the big industrialists". The workers are tired, demoralized and discouraged and are saying, "And was this the reason the communists were expelled from the CTC? It was a thousand times better under Lazaro TAMAYO". A desire to join any group which might help them in their present plight - including the communists - is now becoming stronger.

Report No: TGL-1510.

Date: February 20, 1952

SOURCE COMMENT: The owners of the Crusellas plant are in the process of reducing the labor force by 50-60% and hope to maintain the same production rate as before. The dismissed workers will be transferred to a new plant in the process of construction where the detergent, "FAB", is to be manufactured. The workers are discouraged because they claim that the work performed in the Crusellas plant requires all of the present labor force and the company should hire additional men to work in the FAB plant. The attempt of the Crusellas owners to reduce the labor force in this manner is against standing labor laws of the country, but the Crusellas syndicate led by the Ortodomo labor leaders who are being advised by their communist friends, is taking advantage of the present situation in furthering their own interests.

Attachment to TW-1510

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM

January 24, 1952

To: The Ambassador

From:

Subject: Dr. Portell Vila warns Embassy that Ortodoxo left-wingers are trying to bring Communists into the party.

Dr. Portell Vila called today at the Embassy and during the course of the conversation spoke of his grave preoccupation regarding the efforts of Ortodoxo left-wingers to bring Communists into the party.

He stated that Pardo Llada, Eduardo Corona, Vicentina Antuña, Max Leznik and others were trying to get Communists into the Ortodoxo party. He said that, specifically, they were trying to get the notorious Communist, Salvador García Aguirre, not only into the Ortodoxo party but to run as an Ortodoxo candidate for senator. He said that a group of Ortodoxos approached him on the matter to learn his views and he told them he would resist such a move with all his strength.

Portell Vila said he considered the matter so urgent that he at once wrote an article entitled "Anti-Communism" which he was going to try to get into El Mundo of January 29 instead of Wednesday the 30th which is the day of the week when his column usually appears. He said this would be an extension of his article published January 20 in El Mundo.

I told Portell Vila that while the Embassy maintained a strict neutral attitude in the matter of Cuban politics, it would have a very deep interest in anything pertaining to the Communists when we considered an enemy common to all free countries and free national political parties. I congratulated him on his efforts to keep Communists out of his own Ortodoxo party and wished him every success in this undertaking. I said I assumed that if the party announced notorious Communists as Ortodoxo candidates for office that the party would presumably lose a lot of support from persons who did not wish to be associated with Communists. I added that I hoped my assumption was not mere wishful thinking. He stated that it was definitely not wishful thinking. He stated that it was definitely not wishful thinking and that is exactly what would happen. He said that he would nevertheless oppose the efforts of Pardo Llada and company with all the strength at his command, regardless of whether an association with Communists won or lost votes for the Ortodoxo party.

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CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2 -

Dr. Portell Vila indicated that he would try to keep me informed of developments within the Coloquio party in so far as they related to the Communist. I thanked him, reiterating that my sole interest in the matter was the common threat of Communism to all free nations and particularly Communist success or failure in infiltrating into democratic political parties.



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SECURITY INFORMATION

97

22 JAN 51

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6P

From: [REDACTED]

Report No: TGH-1365 Local File No: 30-248.

No. of Pages: 5

No. of Enclosures: NONE.

Report Made By: [REDACTED]

Distribution:

By copy to:

Wash 3

File 1

Orally to:

No other distribution.

Source Cryptonym: Amlikar.

References: ID-977; TGH-1266.

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

DOCUMENT MICROFILMED

MICROFILMED

COMMENTS

Our TGH-1266 tried to answer as fully as possible ID-977 but it was realized at that time that more complete information on the Juventud Socialista would be appreciated by Headquarters. Amlikar, therefore, was requested to supply us with information which we felt Ambivalent had not supplied previously. The attached report confirms partial information previously supplied by Ambivalent and supplies additional information of interest.

Classification

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FORM NO. 10-50
FEB 1948

CHANGED FROM 12/7/70

19-4-5-11

FILE IN 201-209258*

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Further Information on
the Juventud Socialista.

Report No. ZCM-1365.

Date of Information: 2 Jan 51.

1. The PSP (Partido Socialista Popular, Cuban Communist Party) high command maintains continued interest to a very large degree in the Juventud Socialista organization. One of the principal tasks of the communist party is to maintain the direction of a strong communist youth movement which will respond only to the ideological foundation of the communist party. In the PSP, the most insistent voice of this communist principle is that of BLAS ROCA who takes a personal interest in the direction of the Juventud Socialista and constantly watches over its activities through trusted lieutenants. Many of the present leaders of the PSP were formerly leaders of the Juventud Comunista, the former Juventud Socialista. Men of this type are Severo AGUIRRE, Agsee SUAREZ, and Osvaldo GARCIA, prominent PSP member in Canagley Province. On its own part, the Juventud Socialista maintains a close liaison with the National Executive Committee of the PSP through its leader, Flavio BRAVO, who attends the weekly meetings of the National Committee.
2. The caliber of the Juventud Socialista direction is high. Its leaders are militant communists and many members of the Juventud Socialista National and Provincial Committees have been political candidates for various government offices in past elections. Second to Flavio BRAVO in the leadership of the group is Luis AS MARTIN, both of these men were political candidates in recent elections and have attended various conferences abroad. Other leaders of note are: Lionel SOTO, President of the School of Philosophy, Habana University; Bienvenido ADA and his wife, Yolanda LOPEZ PEREZ; Federico, Rita, and Georgina VILAR, all children of the well-known communist leader, Cesar VILAR, who were educated in Russia; Julio LACRUZ; Bienvenido SUAREZ, Radu VALDES VIVO; Ramon CALINES, Juventud Socialista member from Las Villas Province; Fidel DOMINICH of Oriente Province; and PAEZ (fnu) of the printing section of the Juventud Socialista. Other youth leaders not members of the Juventud Socialista but closely tied up with their activities are: Alfredo GUEVARA; Enrique OVARES; Aramis SABADA, Max SHICK of the Ortodoxo Party, and Humberto L. YACRUZ, President of the Juventud of the PAU (Partido Accion Unitaria) and Director of the newspaper, Yanguayla Unitaria.

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Report No: T44-1365.

Date 22 January 1951.

3. The structure of the Juventud Socialista is like that of the PSP. It has committees in all the districts (barrios) of the City of Habana and in the larger cities of the interior. Up until now the Juventud Socialista has not had, according to source, clandestine leaders to take the place of the present overt leaders in case the party is outlawed, nor does it now have these clandestine leaders. However, source feels that there are many secondary and less well-known leaders within the Juventud Socialista who would be able to assume the direction of a clandestine communist youth organization if the PSP decided such an organization should be set up. Source supplies the following names as possible clandestine leaders of such an organization: Juli ACEDO, "responsable juvenil" (youth representative) of the CTC (Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba) (Communist) a few years ago; Bienvenido GUARIZ, who is the "responsable juvenil" of the CTC (Communist) at present; Federico, Rita, and Georgina VILAR; Walterio CARBONELL, law school student, Habana University; and Hector CARBONELL, communist youth leader at the Ariguanabo textile plant, in Bauta, Habana Province.

4. The PRIO Administrative's anti-communist attitude over the past six months has not visibly affected unfavorably the unity of the Juventud Socialista, according to source. Source gives as a reason for this the fact that the ranks of the Juventud Socialista are composed of proven communist militant youths. Source claims he knows of only one case of defection from the Juventud Socialista ranks, that of a youth named Elio CAPESTANY, Juventud Socialista leader in the Escuela de Artes y Oficios, who has joined the Juventud del PAU.

Comment: As is well known, in other communist parties under similar circumstances and as we have previously reported, some communists have been instructed to infiltrate other political parties. It is difficult to understand how source can conclude positively that the CAPESTANY case was one of defection from the Juventud Socialista.

5. It is true, however, that the PSP has examined very carefully the ranks of the Juventud Socialista for signs of bourgeois weakness. The barrio committees of the PSP established similar committees of the Juventud Socialista with the purpose

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in mind of gaining new members for the party as a whole. The methods by which they tried to attract new members for the Juventud Socialista were made up of sewing clubs for girls, English classes, parlor games, and, from time to time, dances. This method had good results as far as getting the youth to draw closer to the Juventud Socialista; however, racial feeling militated against the complete success of this method for many white girls found that they were expected to mix and dance with negroes, which was against their personal convictions. As a result of this racial prejudice, the majority of negro girls among the Juventud Socialista ranks is noticeable. The PSP has now managed to purify the ranks of the Juventud Socialista in preparation for a harder life ahead. The former sewing circles, parlor games, and dances have disappeared and in their place entertainment less conducive to stirring up racial prejudice, such as excursions into the country, etc., are taking place. Today, the Juventud Socialista ranks can more or less be counted upon to act in a united fashion for the good of the PSP and to follow the orders of their leaders.

6. Although there are no official figures on the membership of the Juventud Socialista, source uses as a yardstick the fact that on one occasion Flavio BRAVO stated that there were more than 15,000 socialist youths in the nation and that of these more than 10,000 were in the City of Habana. Source believes that there is probably an overlap between a member of the Juventud Socialista who is of voting age and also affiliates with the PSP during elections. Taking into account this duplication of membership, source believes that the 15,000 figure is correct.
7. The present activities of the Juventud Socialista are listed as follows:
 - A. The most important job of the Juventud Socialista is its support of the peace-partisans' movement. This consists of street demonstrations, making signs for various parades, collecting signatures, etc.
 - B. The Juventud Socialista constantly tries to maintain good relations with other political youth organizations, such as the Juventud del PAU, of the Ortodoxos, and of the Auténticos libres. The Juventud Socialista also tries to influence

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Date : 22 January 1951.

and keep friends with the FEU (Federación Estudiantil Universitaria) of Habana University, the Masonic youth known as the AJUF, and various schools and universities throughout the island.

- C. They carried out certain demonstrations or propaganda in support of the communist "Plan Cubano contra la Crisis" and the "Conferencia en Defensa de la Economía Nacional."
8. In a national committee meeting of the PJP in June 1950 the directors of the party recommended that the Juventud Socialista spend its energy on the following assignments:
 - A. To work through peasant associations - or organize such associations where they did not exist - in an effort to get such groups to support the partisans of peace movement.
 - B. Make similar efforts among the negroes, intelligentsia, factories, schools, etc.
 - C. To explain to these masses that the USSR is standing for peace along with the popular democracies and China and to demonstrate that the imperialist US stands for war.
 - D. Unite the peasants to the fight of the working-class movement against the PRIO Government and imperialism. The Juventud Socialista should understand that the most important task of all is to perpetuate and further the partisans of peace movement.
9. Recent activities of the Juventud Socialista have been concerned with objections to the UN's entering into the Korean problem and the printing and distribution of their new teen-age magazine, Cascabel. The Juventud Socialista has participated in the past and now participates in worker activities, distributing manifestoes, attending parades, etc. Sometimes they have fought with the Movimiento Juvenil de la CTS (Government) or with elements of the Acción Revolucionaria Guiteras (ARG) in certain parades or to protect their propaganda signs; etc.
10. Flavio BRAVO in his position as leader of the Juventud Socialista maintains constant contact with youth leaders of the Ortodoxos, PAU, Auténticos Libres, AJUF, various student leaders, and protestant religious youth groups. Apart from this, source

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Report No: TKE-1365.


Date: 22 January 1951.

does not supply any indication that BRAVO carries on clandestine liaison with or penetration activities into other youth groups.

11. The Comisión Juvenil of the CTC (Communist) is the same type of organization as the Juventud Socialista but with a different name. The only difference between these two is that the Juventud Socialista is a well-organized unit with a definite membership, whereas the Comisión Juvenil is under the direction of the CTC (Communist) and its membership is mainly made up of Juventud Socialista members with non-communist youths forming the balance. The head of the Comisión Juvenil of the CTC (Communist) is Bienvenido SUAREZ, negro, with his deputies, Hector CARBONELL and Julio LACRADO, also negroes. The official statements and acts of these men are guided and directed by Carlos FERNANDEZ R., one of the communist leaders of the CTC. The activities of the Comisión Juvenil are limited mainly to parades and demonstrations of the CTC itself and they do not have an organized existence in the same manner as the Juventud Socialista. Membership of the Comisión Juvenil is on a much more reduced scale than that of the Juventud Socialista.

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
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
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
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
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<p>INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.</p> <p>SECTION II: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.</p> <p>SECTION III: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.</p> <p>SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.</p>																																																																																
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












CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(S)

TO BE
BIOGRAPHY
INFORMATION

1-67

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET NO. 45-9435

PARENTS							
MOTHER (GIVEN NAME)							
SPOUSE (IF NONE, SO STATE) FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)							
FIRST NAME		BIRTHDATE		CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH		DATE OF MARRIAGE	
FORMER SPOUSES (IF NONE, SO STATE)		FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)		FIRST NAME		BIRTHDATE	
DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE		DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE					

APPLICANT'S RESIDENCE, LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST.

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM MONTH	YEAR	TO MONTH	YEAR

APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT, LAST FIVE YEARS (IF NONE, SO STATE). LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST.

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	YEAR	TO MONTH	YEAR

LAST FOREIGN RESIDENCE OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR (IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE) LAST OCCUPATION ABROAD (IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE)

CITY COUNTRY FROM (MONTH) (YEAR) TO (MONTH) (YEAR)


THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR:

☐ NATURALIZATION ☐ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)


DATE SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER

PENALTY: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT.

31 JUL 1967







Oct 26 1 15 PM '55

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
 CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-209258
 X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-352252
 FILE NO. 52 REY. TO BRANCH ☐
 DESTROY ☐ SIG. 201
 FROM: JOHNSON
 ACTION: WH/C R
 INFO: FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/UR, FI, FI/INT, CAZ, CA/PRO, CAL, 4, CI/INT

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UNIT TIME BY

SECRET 190001Z
 DIR CITE WAVE 5089
 TYPIC AMKNOB AMRAZZ AMOT
 REF DIR 31265

MICROFILMED
 AUG 26 1965
 DOC MICRO. SER.

ABSTRACT
 12 Aug 55 IN 35072
3D

1. AMRAZZ/1 DISCREETLY SOUNDED EXILE COMMUNITY WAVE AREA ON REF RQMS WITH FOLLOWING RESULTS:

A. IDEN A TOLD AMRAZZ/1 ON 7 AUG 65 THAT AMJAG/7 (201-209258) HAD RECENTLY SAID THAT CONFLICTING REPORTS (NATURE AND MEDIUM NOT SPECIFIED) ISSUED BY KUBARK AND ODBEAT RE DOMINICAN CRISIS RESULTED IN DOWNGRADING KUBARK, AND SINCE CRISIS IT RUMORED (NOT SPECIFIED BY WHOM) ODBEAT WOULD BE SUBSTITUTED ANY MOMENT FOR KUBARK IN HANDLING PBRUMEN PROBLEM. IDEN A ADDED HE SURE AMJAG/7 EMPLOYED BY KUBARK AND ASSUMED HE GOT INFO FROM HIS KUBARK CONTACT.

(WAVE COMMENT: IN BOTH DAILY RADIO PROGRAM (IDEN B) AND NEWSPAPER (IDEN C) HE RUNS, IDEN A HAS CONSISTENTLY FOLLOWED ANTI KUBARK LINE SET BY AMBANG/1 INCLUDING HINTS THAT KUBARK BEING LASED OUT OF PBRUMEN OPS. IN MEET WITH AMRAZZ/1, IDEN A PRESUMABLY USED AMJAG/7 NAME WHO HIGHLY RESPECTED ORDER LEND CREDENCE TO RUMOR AND THREW AMJAG/7-KUBARK TIE FOR MORE WEIGHT. AMJAG/7 CONSIDERED VERY

SECRET

201-352252

201-209258
19 Aug 65

SECRET

7/13/53
7035072

DISCREET, BELIEVED NOT KNOWN IN EXILE COMMUNITY AS HAVING ANY KUBARK TIES.)

B. AMTRUNK/1 (201-352252) TOLD AMRAZZ/1 12 AUG OF UNSPECIFIED RUMORS IN EXILE COMMUNITY RE POSSIBLE ODBEAT TAKEOVER OF ANTI PBRUMEN ACTIVITIES. TIME AND EXTENT ODBEAT TAKEOVER NOT KNOWN. AMTRUNK/1 SEES NO DRASTIC CHANGE EVEN IF RUMOR TRUE BUT SAID HE NOTICED GRADUAL DECREASE KUBARK PERSONNEL IN AREA SINCE FALL AMBIDDY/1 AND CORRESPONDING INCREASE ODBEAT AGENTS. ADDED HE PERSONALLY KNEW PBRUMENS IN AREA EMPLOYED BY ODBEAT BUT DECLINED PROVIDE NAMES. (WAVE COMMENTS: MANY MEMBERS AMWORLD ALLUDED TO RO CLAIMED KUBARK STATUS. DECREASE THESE TYPES SINCE DISANDMENT AMWORLD COULD ACCOUNT FOR ALLEGED REDUCTION NUMBER KUBARK AGENTS WAVE AREA.)

2. WAVE FEELS RUMORS GENERATED SOME EXTENT BY AX-GRINDERS LIKE IDEN A AND BY OPPORTUNISTS HOPING FOR OVERALL CHANGE WHICH MIGHT ENABLE THEM GAIN ODYOKE SUPPORT FOR OWN PERSONAL AIMS. NEWSPAPER IDEN D CONTRIBUTED TO START OF RUMORS BY PLAYING UP ODENVY "INVESTIGATION" KUBARK ACTIVITIES SANTO DOMINGO AND HINTING NEW CHIEF KUBARK INDICATED PHASE OUT CIVILIAN CONTROL ANTI PBRUMEN OPS.

SECRET

CFN 5289 31065 AMRAZZ/1 RQMS A AMRAZZ/1 7 65 AMJAG 201-209258

NOT SPECIFIED KUBARK ODBEAT RE DOMINICAN NOT SPECIFIED PBRUMEN

SECRET

